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Abstract
Different aspects of external information flows have typically been lumped together
under the name "spillovers". We attempt to refine our understanding of external information
flows through the construction of firm-specific measures of incoming spillovers and
appropriability from survey data on Belgian manufacturing firms. Incoming spillovers
measure the importance of publicly available information for the innovation process of the
firm.  Appropriability is defined as the effectiveness of several protection mechanisms for
appropriating the benefits of successful innovations. The importance of this distinction
between incoming spillovers and appropriability is revealed when contrasting their effects on
different types of cooperative agreements. The decision to cooperate with research institutes
is mainly affected by the level of incoming spillovers, while appropriability plays an
important role for cooperating with suppliers or customers.
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I.  Introduction
Successful innovation depends on the development and integration of new
knowledge in the innovation process. Part of this knowledge will reach the firm from external
sources. Several authors have documented the existence of these external information flows
and have commented on their importance for decisions at the firm level (Jaffe, 1986;
Bernstein and Nadiri, 1988, 1989) and ultimately for economic growth (Romer, 1986, 1990;
Krugman, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Griliches, 1992). One challenge facing this
literature has been the measurement of these information flows or "spillovers" between firms
and gauging their effect on different innovation management decisions by the firm.  The
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we attempt to clarify the concept of spillovers and
their measurement. The second contribution of this paper is that we use measures of
spillovers to empirically analyze the decision of firms to engage in cooperative agreements in
R&D.  
In order to clarify the concept of spillovers, one needs to distinguish between
different measures of these spillovers. On the one hand, there are measures of the importance
of external information flows for the rate of success of the firm’s innovation process. These
information sources are typically situated in the public domain and their usefulness to the
firm depends on the firm’s ability to generate incoming spillovers from this general pool of
knowledge.  Many things can be measured here: the total pool of external knowledge that is
potentially available, the fraction of this pool that is accessible and relevant to the firm, the
know-how that is effectively absorbed and used within the firm, or the effectiveness of this
absorbed knowledge for the firm’s innovative performance. On the other hand, firms attempt
to appropriate the benefits of their innovations by controlling the information flows out of the
company into the pool of publicly available information. The success of a firm’s innovation
strategy not only depends on the success of its innovation process, but is also a function of
how proficient the firm is at appropriating any benefits from its successful innovation
process. Typically, the protected information is commercially sensitive and the success or
profitability of a firm’s innovation strategy crucially depends on legal and strategic measures
of protection to restrict these outgoing spillovers. Here as well different measures are
possible: the usefulness and/or degree of difficulty to a firm of protecting its own knowledge,
the fraction of know-how it can keep proprietary, the potential economic returns to a given
firm’s own knowledge that it manages to appropriate, or the potential social returns from the
non-appropriated knowledge.  
Throughout the paper, we will distinguish between incoming spillovers, which affect
the rate of innovation of the firm, and outgoing spillovers which affect the ability of the firmto appropriate the returns from innovation. We will explore a direct measure of incoming
spillovers, as measured by the importance of publicly available information for the
innovation process of the firm, obtained from survey data on Belgian manufacturing firms.
Alternative measures of incoming spillovers used in the literature require the construction of
a pool of available and relevant knowledge (o.a. Jaffe (1986)). The estimated effect of this
pool of available knowledge on the firm’s decision variables is then the spillover effect. The
advantage of our measure is that it avoids the construction of a pool of available knowledge
by jointly measuring the extent of the pool of relevant knowledge and its productivity for the
firm’s innovation process.
Using the same survey data, we can also construct a direct measure of
appropriability which rates the effectiveness of different mechanisms for protecting the
innovations of the firm. Alternatively, one could use regression analysis to calculate the
average gap between private and social rates of return (Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). But as
mentioned before, this requires the construction of a pool of general knowledge relevant to
the firm. The advantage of our measure of appropriability is that it is direct and firm-specific.
The disadvantage of both our measures of incoming spillovers and appropriability is that
their construction relies on qualitative firm-level data, which requires the necessary caution
in interpretation.
The second contribution of this paper is that we use these measures of incoming
spillovers and appropriation to analyze their impact on the decision of firms to engage in
cooperative R&D. The pervasiveness of cooperative agreements in R&D has become a
significant feature in current innovation management practice.   It offers firms more efficient
access to new external information and allows them to integrate this information more
effectively into their innovation process.  However, cooperation in R&D carries more risks
with respect to the loss of commercially sensitive information and hence might diminish the
firm’s ability to appropriate the benefits of successful innovations. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that empirically investigates the relation between
cooperation in R&D and spillovers. This is surprising given the extensive theoretical
literature which focuses on this relationship.
We find that there is indeed a significant correlation between external information
flows and the decision to cooperate in R&D. Firms that rate generally available external
information sources as more important inputs to their innovation process—the incoming
spillovers—are more likely to be actively engaged in cooperative R&D agreements. At the
same time, firms that are more effective in appropriating the results from their innovation
process are also more likely to cooperate in R&D. The importance of distinguishing between
measures of incoming spillovers and appropriability becomes even more apparent when
analyzing the type of partner with which firms cooperate.  Higher incoming spillovers
positively affect the probability of cooperating with research institutes such as universities
and public or private research labs, but have no effect on cooperation with customers or
suppliers. Firms who find the publicly available pool of knowledge more important for their
innovation process are more likely to benefit from cooperative agreements with other
research institutes. Better appropriability of results of the innovation process, however,
increases the probability of cooperating with customers or suppliers and is unrelated to
cooperative agreements with research institutes. Commercially sensitive information, which
is the result of these more applied research projects, often leaks out to competitors through
common suppliers or customers. Hence, only firms that can sufficiently protect their
proprietary information are willing to engage in this type of cooperative agreements.
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incoming spillovers and appropriability. This effect, again, only becomes apparent when
distinguishing between different types of cooperative R&D agreements. Cooperative
agreements between research partners increase the usefulness of the publicly available pool
of knowledge and the effectiveness of appropriation mechanisms for the firm’s innovation
process. Cooperative agreements with suppliers or customers, however, reduce the
effectiveness of strategic protection measures. This suggests that the commercially sensitive
information that firms might disseminate indirectly through cooperative agreements with
suppliers and customers could be detrimental to the efforts of the firm to appropriate the
returns from its innovation process.  Hence, firms should take care to protect their proprietary
information before engaging in these types of agreements. Our results, therefore, strongly
suggest that the level of knowledge in- and outflows is not, as assumed in much of the
theoretical literature, exogenous to the firm. But through their innovation activities, firms
affect their incoming spillovers and appropriation capabilities.
In the next section we discuss the theoretical issues related to external information
flows and cooperation in R&D; we describe the data and set up an empirical model to
analyze the relationship between the decision to cooperate and spillovers. Section 3 presents
the results of our analysis and section 4 concludes.
II. R&D Cooperation and Spillovers
Issues
The relationship between different knowledge flows –spillovers– and cooperation is
complex. The theoretical literature has mainly focused on the effect of imperfect
appropriability of results from the innovation process on the incentives to innovate, when the
firm cooperates in R&D. On the one hand, imperfect appropriability increases the benefits
from cooperative R&D agreements. Firms that cooperate in R&D choose their R&D
investments to jointly maximize profits. Hence, cooperation in R&D internalizes the positive
externality created by involuntary knowledge transfers and investment in R&D is increasing
in the level of the spillover. When spillovers are high enough, i.e. above a critical level,
cooperating firms will spend more on R&D and are increasingly more profitable compared to
non-cooperating firms (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992).
On the other hand, imperfect appropriability increases the incentive of firms to free ride on
each other’s R&D investments. First, partners may conceal their technological expertise
while trying to absorb as much of the partner’s knowledge as possible (e.g. Shapiro and
Willig, 1990; Baumol, 1993; Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1994). Higher spillover levels increase
partners’ potential benefits from cheating. The second free riding problem results from firms
that remain outside the cooperative agreement. Lower appropriability of results encourages
free-riding on the R&D efforts of the research joint venture by an outsider to the cooperative
agreement (Greenlee and Cassiman, 1999; De Bondt and Wu, 1997). Hence, cooperative
ventures not only become more profitable, but also easier to sustain the better firms are at
appropriating the benefits of their innovation process. 
Imperfect appropriability of innovation results leads to information flows that
increase the stock of publicly available knowledge from which other firms draw information
for their own innovation process. Firms attempt to manage these incoming information flows.
First, they try to increase the extent of incoming spillovers by investing in "absorptive
capacity". Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that external knowledge is more effective for
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absorptive capacity is thus to increase the effectiveness of incoming information. Secondly, a
firm might increase its incoming spillovers by voluntarily trading knowledge with partners,
as in the research joint venture information sharing scenario of Kamien et al. (1992).
Increasing the incoming spillovers between research partners is found to increase not only the
profitability, but also the stability of cooperation in R&D, since it makes the potential threat
of non-sharing harsher (Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1994; Eaton and Eswaran, 1997).
Finally, the choice of research approach by the firm influences the appropriability
conditions it faces and the extent of incoming spillovers it enjoys. Kamien and Zang (2000)
show that firms that cooperatively choose their R&D expenditures maximize information
flows—their incoming spillovers—through the choice of very broad research directions for
the research joint venture. If the firms cannot coordinate their R&D expenditures, they are
more concerned about managing their outgoing spillovers by choosing a more narrow
research approach which improves appropriability but at the same time limits the usefulness
of external information sources for their own innovation process. 
In most theoretical models on cooperation in R&D and spillovers, firms generate and
receive spillovers to the same extent.  Assuming symmetric incoming and outgoing spillovers
makes it difficult to model the idea that firms manage these information flows. The aim of
managing the external information flows is to maximize the incoming spillovers from partners
and non-partners, while at the same time minimizing spillovers to non-partners and non-loyal
partners. In our empirical analysis we will not be concerned with the equilibrium analysis as
performed in most of the theoretical work. In the relationship between spillovers and
cooperation, we want to highlight the distinction between two measures of knowledge flows,
namely incoming spillovers, measured as the usefulness of external information as an input for
the innovation process, and, appropriability, measured as the effectiveness in capturing value
from a successful innovation. We allow for heterogeneity among firms along these dimensions.
The ability to create incoming spillovers from the general pool of knowledge can be a function
of other innovation activities of the firm such as own R&D, participation in cooperative
agreements, the type of research the firm engages in, or the technological opportunities in the
industry. At the same time, firms that cooperate pay special attention to protecting their
proprietary knowledge. The ability to protect valuable information from reaching other firms
also depends on the firm’s innovation activities such as own R&D, the firm’s competitive
environment and the appropriability conditions in the industry. But a firm’s effectiveness in
protecting commercially sensitive information might be reduced by the knowledge flows
created through participating in cooperative R&D agreements.
Data
The data used for this study are drawn from the Community Innovation Survey
(CIS) conducted in several member states of the European Union in 1993. The survey
intended to develop insights into the problems of technological innovation in the
manufacturing industry and was the first of its kind organized in many of the participating
countries (1). We will restrict attention to the subsample of innovating firms from Belgian
manufacturing industry (2). These firms are distinguished from those who do not innovate
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(1) A more detailed analysis of these data is reported in Veugelers and Cassiman (1999).
(2) The authors are grateful to DWTC and IWT for providing the data. These organizations were responsible
for the collection of the Belgian subsample of the CIS, which was conducted by Eurostat. A representative
sample of 1335 Belgian manufacturing firms was selected and a 13-page questionnaire sent out to them.
The response rate was higher than 50% (748). The researchers in charge of collecting the data for the CIS
also performed a limited non-response analysis and concluded that no systematic biases could be detected
(Debackere and Fleurent, 1995).based on their answers to the questions about whether they innovated between 1990 and
1992. Innovation is defined by introducing new or improved products, or new or improved
processes, and, at the same time, firms needed to have specified a positive amount spent on
innovation. In the sample, 60% (439) of the firms claim to innovate, while only 40% do not.
This number is in line with the survey results from other EU countries (Eurostat, Statistics in
Focus, 1996-2). Due to missing values we are left with 411 observations on actively
innovating firms. For these firms, the questionnaire provides information that allows to
construct measures for both incoming spillovers and appropriability (3). 
Incoming spillovers: In the questionnaire, firms rated the importance for their
innovation process of publicly available information from three sources on a 5-point Likert
scale (from unimportant (1) to crucial (5)). These information sources were: patent
information; specialist conferences, meetings and publications; trade shows and seminars. We
aggregated these answers by summing the scores on each of these three questions and re-
scaled the total score to a number between 0 and 1 to generate a firm-specific measure of
incoming spillovers: INSPILL (4).  To capture the exogenous nature of spillovers, determined
by technology or market characteristics, we also construct the average industry score for
INSPILL:  indINSPILL (5). The questionnaire thus provides a direct measure of the
importance of incoming spillovers for the innovation process. Studies relying on the indirect
measurement of incoming spillovers require the construction of a pool of available and
relevant knowledge for each firm in the sample. In order to assess which agents benefit more
from a given knowledge stock, a measure of "distance" between technology receiver and
generator needs to be included.  Several approaches are used in the literature: input-output
flows (Terleckyj, 1974), technology flows obtained from patent information (6),  import or
FDI flows for international channels (Coe and Helpman, 1988). Our measure avoids this by
jointly measuring the extent of the pool of relevant knowledge and its productivity for the
firm’s innovation process. 
Appropriability: Firms rated the effectiveness of five different methods for
protecting products and processes respectively (10 different questions overall) on a 5-point
Likert scale (from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial)). The five methods were: patents; brand
names and copyright; secrecy; complexity; and lead time. We distinguish between two types
of protection: legal protection of products and processes through patents, brand names or
copyright, and strategic protection of products and processes through secrecy, complexity
or lead time. Again we aggregated answers on each of these questions by summing the scores
on each of these questions and rescaled the total score to a number between 0 and 1 to
generate a measure of legal and strategic protection. However, we will only use strategic
protection, PROTstrat, as a firm level variable, assuming that legal protection is an industry,
rather than a firm-specific characteristic. The industry averages indPROTleg and
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(3) Only the innovating firms needed to fill out all questions in the survey. Restricting the sample to innovating
firms might lead to sample selection if we believed that cooperation is an important way to innovate for
firms that would otherwise not be innovation active. This is unlikely, however, given that all firms that
cooperate do have some other innovation strategies, such as own R&D or some form of external knowledge
acquisition (see Veugelers and Cassiman (1999)). 
(4) See Table A1 in the Appendix for the definition of all variables used. The rescaling of a variable with Likert
scores between 1 and 5 to a variable between 0 and 1 is done for each Likert score used in the analysis:
rescaled score = (score - 1)/4. This allows the comparison of coefficients. 
(5) The industry is defined at the NACE 2 digit sector level and the average is the average score from the firms
responding in the sample.
(6) Various approaches have been pursued here: patent information on principal users in the Yale studies,
supplementary technology codes in EPO (Verspagen, 1995), clustering techniques (Jaffe, 1986), citations
(Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg, 1993).indPROTstrat capture the technology and market characteristics that determine the
appropriability regime of the industry. 
From the questionnaire we derive a direct measure of the beliefs of the firm’s
management about the effectiveness of various mechanisms to protect their innovations. In
the literature, there exist two alternative ways of measuring appropriability by way of
estimating the gap between private and social rates of return of innovation. Both have their
own limitations (see Griliches, 1992). First, one can restrict attention to a specific innovation.
This requires intimate knowledge of the innovation to track information flows. The limitation
of this type of study is that it is not representative and only considers "important"
innovations. Second, the results of regression based studies can be used to calculate the
average gap between private and social rates of return for an industry (Bernstein and Nadiri,
1989). But as discussed before, this requires the construction of a pool of general knowledge
which is relevant to the firm. The advantage of our measure of appropriability is that it is
firm-specific and does not require detailed knowledge of the different innovations of the firm.
Although the use of survey data yields direct firm-specific measures for incoming
spillovers and appropriability, it also introduces some subjectivity into the measurement of
these firm-specific measures INSPILL and  PROTstrat, which would lead to problems
of measurement error. A first potential problem of measurement error is the aggregation of
scores of different questions. However, the different questions on the importance of information
sources for the innovation process and on the effectiveness of measures of protection were
grouped in the same subsection of the questionnaire. Comparing the scores on the different
questions should therefore have come naturally to the respondents. Nevertheless, we
experimented with different measures and combinations of these variables and all lead to
similar results. Second, individual respondents may also differ in their use of the 5-point scale.
This would introduce a more serious problem of measurement error (7). Other studies, most
notably Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Levin (1988), have found that including industry
means for the qualitative variables reduces the problems of using subjective measures. They use
the data of the Yale Survey to construct measures of appropriability at the industry level and
these variables have been widely used in related applications (8). However, the beliefs of
management about the external environment are what drive a firm’s decision about whether or
not to engage in a cooperative agreement. As shown below, firm-specific measures capture
these effects better than industry specific variables, since they increase the explanatory power of
the empirical model considerably. Our data allow for alternative corrections for measurement
error, avoiding industry aggregation. We indirectly attempt to control for measurement error
problems by regressing INSPILL and PROTstrat on instruments available in the data set that are
assumed to be exogenous and with uncorrelated measurement errors. 
Closer examination of our knowledge flow variables, INSPILL on the one hand and
PROTstrat on the other, shows that they do capture different effects. Correlation between
INSPILL and PROTstrat is only 0.21 and there is a lot of variation in the ranking of the
industries according to each of our measures (9). As could be expected, the chemical industry
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(7) Unfortunately, our data set lacks a panel structure that would allow for simple fixed firm effect corrections.
(8) See among others: Levin, Cohen and Mowery (1985), Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1987), Levin (1988),
Levin and Reiss (1988), Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Klevorick, Levin, Nelson and Winter (1995).
(9) In addition, we performed a principal component analysis on the answers of the thirteen questions used for the
construction of INSPILL, PROTleg and PROTstrat. Three principal components explain 60% of the variance
and each question loaded most weight on one of the three principal components in line with our constructed
measures. Not surprisingly, then, the principal components are strongly correlated with the constructed spillover
and appropriability measures. The correlation between our constructed variables and the respective principal
components was more than 0.92. We have performed the same analysis using the principal components. The
qualitative results do not change, but interpretation is enhanced when using our constructed variables.ranks high on the importance of incoming spillovers (ranked 2nd out of 19 industries) as well
as on the effectiveness of patent protection (ranked 1st), but it is only ranked 8th in strategic
protection. The apparel and textile industries score low on all measures. However, there are
industries that score high on the importance of incoming spillovers, but low on
appropriability such as the electronics industry which is ranked 4th on the importance of
incoming spillovers, but only 13th for legal protection and 16th for strategic protection. As
for the data of Levin et al. (1987), we find that within industry variation in the variables is
much more important than between industry variation (see Cockburn and Griliches (1988)).
This should not surprise us given the recent observation of substantial within industry
heterogeneity of firm characteristics (Haltiwanger et al, 1999).
The cooperation variable: In the questionnaire the firms were asked to reveal
whether they had cooperative agreements in R&D and to indicate the type of partners they
cooperated with. Cooperation was understood to imply an active participation of the partners
in a joint R&D project. We set the variable COOP equal to 1 when firms indicated that they
had at least one cooperative agreement with any type of partner and 0 otherwise (10).  In our
data set there are 185 firms that have at least one type of cooperative agreement in R&D. The
data also allow us to distinguish different types of cooperative partners: competitors (33),
vertically related firms, i.e. suppliers or customers  (135) and  universities or other research
institutes (135) (11).  In order to uncover common characteristics of the cooperation decision
we first pool the data on cooperative agreements (COOP). Next, we perform our analysis for
cooperative agreements with vertical partners (COOPVERT) and research institutes
(COOPRES) separately (12). The nature of the partners is important in understanding the
differential effect of incoming spillovers versus appropriability on the decision of firms to
cooperate in R&D: incoming spillovers affect the decision to cooperate with research
institutes. Appropriability, in contrast, is intimately related to the decision of the firm to
cooperate with customers or suppliers.
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the cumulative distributions of the importance of
incoming spillovers for the firm’s innovation process (INSPILL)  and the effectiveness
of strategic protection (PROTstrat) for cooperating and non-cooperating firms. These figures
provide some first indication of the correlation between higher incoming spillovers and more
effective protection, and the propensity of firms to cooperate.  The cumulative distribution of
cooperating firms always lies below the cumulative distribution of the non-cooperating firms,
indicating a higher rating of cooperating firms of the importance of incoming spillovers as
well as a higher rating on the effectiveness of protection of know-how (13). 
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(10) Most studies of the determinants of R&D cooperation use the frequency of occurrence of R&D
cooperation to assess which characteristics are more likely to lead to R&D cooperation (Röller et al.,
1997; Kleinknecht and Van Reijnen, 1992; Colombo and Gerrone, 1996).
(11) The questionnaire only contains information on whether firms cooperate or not, but not on budgets spent.
Several firms do have cooperative agreements with different types of partners.  But within one partner
category, we have no information on the number of cooperative agreements. Information on the partner is
also not available. Therefore, the data do not allow us to identify spillover flows to and from partners
versus non-partners in cooperation.
(12) The limited number of cooperative agreements between competitors does not allow us to do a similar
analysis with this latter group. However, it is already interesting to note that most of the cooperative
agreements are vertical or with research institutes (see Robertson and Gatignon (1998) for similar results).
This contrasts with the bulk of the theoretical literature, which mainly analyzes cooperative agreements
between competitors.
(13) For eight out of the nine questions used for the construction of the spillover and protection variables, the
mean answer for cooperating firms was significantly higher, at the 1% level of significance, than the mean
answer for firms that did not cooperate. For the importance of trade shows and seminars the mean answers
were not significantly different, although the cooperating firms had a higher mean score.Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of importance of incoming spillovers for cooperating and
noncooperating firms

































The focus of the analysis is on the effects of our measures of incoming spillovers
(INSPILL) and appropriability (PROTstrat) on R&D cooperation. Differentiating between
incoming spillovers and appropriation will prove particularly important when examining their
effect on different types of cooperative agreements. Following the literature, we expect that
higher incoming spillovers increase the scope for learning within cooperative R&D
agreements. Because of an improved technological competence of the partners, the marginal
benefit of forming a research joint venture is higher, implying a higher probability of
cooperation. Henderson and Cockburn (1996), in a related paper, show that knowledge flows
between research groups in related therapeutical classes are an important determinant of
research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry. These spillovers, measured as patent
citations, thus impact the pharmaceutical firms’ innovation process and determine whether
different therapeutical classes will be integrated within the same firm. 
The theoretical literature does not provide clear-cut predictions about the sign of the
appropriability variable. On the one hand, lower appropriability, increases the scope for
the internalization of information flows between firms through cooperation in R&D. On the
other hand, lower appropriability increases free rider problems related to R&D investments,
which reduce profitability and threaten the stability of cooperative agreements in R&D.
When the appropriation regime is tight, i.e. protection is more effective, firms can more
easily enter into R&D cooperation, controlling knowledge flows to non-partners or non-loyal
partners. Distinguishing between different types of cooperative R&D agreements –vertical
cooperation, or, cooperation with research institutes– one would expect that more generic
incoming spillovers affect cooperation with research institutes more. In contrast,
appropriation is a key issue when dealing with more commercially sensitive information in
vertical cooperative agreements.
In addition to our measures of spillovers we include variables that have been shown
in previous studies to affect cooperation in R&D (Röller et al., 1997; Kleinknecht and Van
Reijnen, 1992; Colombo and Gerrone, 1996). These studies provide strong evidence about
the size and R&D orientation of firms positively affecting R&D cooperation. This is
reminiscent of the absorptive capacity idea which stresses the need to have in-house
(technological) power to optimally benefit from R&D cooperation. We allow for a non-linear
effect of size on the probability of cooperation in R&D (SIZE, SIZEsq) and include a dummy
variable for whether or not the firm performs R&D on a permanent basis (PermRD) (14). By
including  INSPILL and PermRD in the same relation, we can test whether the effect of
absorptive capacity on R&D cooperation, in addition, runs through its effect on the
importance of external information sources. At the same time, internal R&D capacity is an
intrinsic element of any strategy to protect know-how, adding another indirect effect of R&D
capacity on R&D cooperation through PROTstrat. 
As work by Mariti and Smiley (1983) and Tyler and Steensma (1995) has indicated,
other motives such as cost and risk sharing as well as getting access to new technologies are
important incentives for cooperation. Sakakibara (1997a,b) finds that access to
complementary knowledge is one of the most important objectives for establishing
government sponsored research corporations in Japan. Our survey information allows us to
proxy for these motives. The firms rated the importance of different obstacles to innovation
on a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial). When costs are an important obstacle to
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(14) Reported budgets for R&D proved to be unreliable.innovation, we expect to observe more cooperative agreements with the purpose of cost
sharing. We construct an aggregate measure of the responses to four questions on the
importance of costs as an obstacle to innovation (COST). These obstacles were: a lack of
suitable financing; high costs of innovation; a long pay-back period; and, difficult to control
costs of innovation.  Similarly, we expect that higher risks and uncertainty in the innovation
process favor risk sharing through the organization of cooperative agreements in R&D. RISK
measures the importance of high risks as a barrier to innovation. Finding suitable partners to
cooperate with requires knowledge about technological opportunities in the market. TECH
measures the availability of technological information for innovation within the firm.
Although a lack of internal technological know-how may drive firms to cooperate in order to
access missing technologies externally, it simultaneously reduces the scope for
complementarities that could be exploited through cooperation. Hence, we use TECH as a
measure of the potential for realizing complementarities with partners in a cooperative
agreement in R&D (15). Finally, we include the industry variable indCOOP,  which we
assume will pick up unobserved industry-specific attributes that contribute to the decision of
a firm to engage in a cooperative agreement (16). 
The level of incoming spillovers and the effectiveness of appropriation mechanisms
might not only affect profitability and hence the decision to cooperate, but, when firms use
cooperative agreements as a vehicle to manage external knowledge flows, the decision to
cooperate could also influence the actual level of incoming spillovers and the effectiveness of
appropriation strategies. Cooperating firms may try to maximize incoming spillovers among
partners through information sharing, which will enhance the profitability as well as the
stability of cooperation. Related, Brandstetter and Sakakibara (1998) find that R&D
cooperation positively affects the research productivity of the partners and attribute this to the
increased incoming spillovers between partners (17). Moreover, in response to free-riding, firms
will want to limit outgoing spillovers to non-partners.  Although outgoing technology flows to
partners are essential in information sharing agreements in search of synergies, such agreements
could possibly reduce the effectiveness of measures of protection.  Firms need to carefully
manage this exposure of own know-how within the alliance in view of the threat of
opportunistic partners. We expect that firms that are considering R&D cooperation have an
incentive to invest in mechanisms increasing appropriability in general and becoming more
successful at controlling information sharing with their partners, as well as limiting free-riding
by non-partners. Again, we should expect that the effect of cooperation on external knowledge
flows differs according to type of cooperative agreement. The more generic nature of research
projects with universities and research institutes should affect the potential for incoming
spillovers from the sharing of knowledge, but should have little effect on appropriation. Vertical
cooperative agreements, on the contrary, might be more hazardous for appropriation given their
commercially sensitive content.
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(15) See Data Appendix for a precise definition of all the variables. Note that our sample consists of innovating
firms. Hence, we expect these variables to affect how they organize their innovation process, rather than
whether they innovate or not. The construction of the variables COST, RISK and TECH might again
introduce some measurement error/subjectivity because of the use of a subjective rating scale. However,
we will assume that this measurement error is uncorrelated to the measurement error/subjectivity from
their response to the importance of external sources of information and the effectiveness of measures of
protection. This is consistent with the low correlation between INSPILL and PROTstrat on the one hand
and COST, RISK and TECH on the other. 
(16) Dummy variables for the industry, when included, were not significant and did not affect the results.
(17) See also Kleinknecht (1999) for a related result.Since our main interest lies in uncovering the relation between cooperation and
spillovers, we will focus the endogeneity discussion on INSPILL and PROTstrat, assuming
all other variables to be exogenous. The only exception is the variable PermRD, for which
there are strong a priori reasons identified in the literature to expect endogeneity.  Not only
will own R&D enhance the efficiency of cooperation, but external sourcing through
cooperation may stimulate or discourage own R&D (Veugelers, 1997, Colombo and Garrone,
1996). In order to address the possible endogeneity problems, we will use a two-step
estimation procedure. The two-step estimation procedure consists of regressing the
endogenous variables on all the assumed exogenous variables in the first step. Unfortunately,
it is unlikely that many of the variables available are truly exogenous. Nevertheless, for the
purpose of our investigation –uncovering the relation between cooperation and spillovers–
they will be assumed to be exogenous. In the second step, we use the predicted values of the
endogenous variables as independent variables in the structural equations. Furthermore, this
estimation procedure might alleviate problems of measurement error arising from the use of
qualitative measures of incoming spillovers and strategic protection by regressing INSPILL
and PROTstrat on exogenous instruments (18) (19). Included as instruments are the industry
averages for each of the endogenous variables. We assume that each of these industry mean
variables pick up the effects of unobserved industry-specific attributes that contribute to that
endogenous firm-specific variable (20).  
The structural equations for INSPILL and  PROTstrat might be of independent
interest for understanding the relation between our spillovers measures and cooperation and
are hence reported and discussed explicitly. For incoming spillovers, INSPILL, the literature
seems to suggest that absorptive capacity through internal technological capabilities is
important to optimally benefit from external information flows. Therefore, firms that perform
R&D on a permanent basis  should attribute higher importance to incoming spillovers. As an
explanatory variable we thus include the estimated PermRD variable. It is often argued that
generic research diffuses more easily (Vonortas, 1994; Kamien and Zang, 1998).  Hence,
firms that find sources of basic R&D more important for their innovation process, relative to
information sources of applied R&D, are more likely to benefit from incoming spillovers and
hence are expected to have a higher score on INSPILL. The variable BasicRD measures the
importance for the innovation process of information from research institutes and universities
relative to the importance of suppliers and customers as an information source. We use this
variable to proxy for the "basicness" of R&D performed by the firm (21) (22). The industry
variable  indINSPILL is included as well to capture the technological conditions of the
industry influencing knowledge flows.
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(18) In addition to being computationally less demanding, using our two-step estimation procedure provides
more robust estimates compared to simultaneous estimating the system (COOP[Vert-Res],  INSPILL,
PROTstrat, PermRD) by maximum likelihood. Simultaneous estimation, requiring a full specification of
all structural equations,  might be plagued by biases arising from omitted variables in any of the individual
equations, leading to inconsistent estimates for the whole system (see Vella and Verbeek (1999)). 
(19) In order to avoid inconsistent estimates for the second step estimation in the case of a dichotomous
endogenous variable in a probit equation, which is the case for PermRD, we estimate the PermRD first
step equation as a linear probability model and use the predicted value of the latent variable in the second
step of the estimation (Heckman and Macurdy (1985)). Note that the latent variable in this case, the R&D
intensity of the firm, is the economic variable of interest underlying the variable PermRD.
(20) For a full specification of the model and the instruments, see also Appendix.
(21) The questionnaire grouped all the questions on the importance of different information sources for the
innovation process in the same subsection. Scores of the same firms should be readily comparable. Note
that by using this ratio of two scores, the potential problems of the subjectivity of these measures is
reduced.
(22) This is one of the variables that is likely to be endogeneous, but since the purpose of this paper is to study
the decision to cooperate and the drivers of external knowledge flows, we will assume that the research
approach chosen by the firm, i.e. the relative mix between basic and applied research, is exogenous.  The strategic protection variable PROTstrat will be influenced in particular by the
competitive environment of the firm. The more competitive the environment, the more a firm is
expected to invest in protecting any technological competence. More export intensive firms
typically face a more competitive environment (EXPint). Firms with a higher internal
technological capacity might not only be better at absorbing incoming spillovers, but also be
better at protecting their knowledge through secrecy, complexity or lead time. Therefore, we
include the estimated PermRD as an explanatory variable. The variable indPROTstrat is included
to capture technological conditions shaping strategic protection possibilities in the industry.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics about the variables used. Consistent with
our model hypotheses, the mean values of all variables are higher for cooperating firms than
for firms without cooperative R&D agreements. As suggested, the mean importance of
incoming spillovers is slightly higher for firms cooperating with research institutes compared
to firms that cooperate with customers or suppliers. This contrasts with the mean
effectiveness of strategic protection mechanisms, where the reverse is true (23). 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Results
First, we discuss the importance of incoming spillovers and appropriability for the
pooled cooperation decision of the firms, with and without correcting for endogeneity of the
knowledge flow and permanent R&D variables. Next, we estimate the models for vertical
































































































***difference in means between cooperating and not cooperating firms significant at 1%,
**significant at 5%, *significant at 10%
standard deviations in parenthesis
(23) This difference is even more pronounced when comparing the means of INSPILL and PROTstrat for firms
that exclusively cooperate with one type of partner.our measures of incoming spillovers and appropriability. Finally, we discuss the structural
equations for incoming spillovers and appropriability.
Spillovers and  Cooperation
We estimate a Probit model of whether the firms decide to cooperate or not (24).  The
coefficients in Table 2 present the marginal effect of the independent variables on the
probability of cooperating, while keeping everything else constant. Robust standard errors are
estimated for these coefficients. Regression (1) does not include incoming spillovers and
appropriability measures. Adding our firm-specific measures of incoming spillovers and
strategic protection significantly increases the explanatory power of the regression (see
regression (2)). Incoming spillovers have a positive and significant effect on the probability of
firms cooperating (INSPILL). The existing base of know-how is better tapped by cooperating
firms because of the improved technological competence of the partners. This increases the
expected profitability of cooperative agreements and hence makes them more likely to occur.
Table 2. Results of Pooled Probit Regressions for Cooperation
13





















































































































*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
robust standarderrors between brackets. The coefficients are the marginal effect of
the independent variable onthe probability of cooperation, ceteris paribus. For
PermRD it is the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 in (1) and (2).
(24) Logit estimations give similar results.Similarly, higher appropriability through strategic protection has a positive effect on
the probability of firms cooperating.  The more effective strategic protection is, the better
firms control the outflow of commercially sensitive information, and the more likely they are
to engage in cooperative agreements (PROTstrat). Hence, better appropriability reduces the
potential for free riding within and beyond the cooperative agreement and improves the
stability of these agreements. However, as regressions (2) and (3) show, the effect of
incoming spillovers and appropriability is moderated by own R&D activities of the firm.
Once controlling for permanent R&D, the coefficients of INSPILL and PROTstrat are
reduced and PROTstrat loses some significance. This result suggests that the R&D
capabilities of the firm and the effectiveness of appropriating returns from its innovation
process are strongly interrelated.
As regressions (4) and (5) demonstrate, the correction for the endogeneity of
INSPILL, PROTstrat and PermRD does not change our findings on the signs and significance
of the coefficients of the spillover effects, but significantly increases the estimated
coefficients (25). The increase in the estimated coefficients might not only indicate an
endogeneity problem, but could also reflect a problem of measurement error with INSPILL
and  PROTstrat, in which case the uncorrected estimates are biased towards zero (26).
Furthermore, PermRD shows up insignificant once corrected for endogeneity and does not
significantly affect the point estimate of INSPILL and PROTstrat. One disadvantage of our
two-step procedure is that it introduces multicollinearity between the predicted values of the
endogenous variables, reducing significance of the estimated coefficients (27). 
Next, we discuss the non-spillover determinants of cooperation. The signs and
significance levels of all the coefficients of these variables remain fairly robust across the
different regressions. Not surprisingly, larger firms are more likely to cooperate. The effect of
firm size is very significant, with evidence for a non-linear concave relation. When costs are an
important obstacle to innovation, innovating firms have a strongly significant higher probability
of engaging in cooperative agreements (COST). While cost-sharing seems to be an important
driver for cooperation, risk-sharing is not.  On the contrary, firms for which risk is an important
barrier to innovate are less likely to cooperate (RISK).  Viewed from a transaction cost
perspective, however, this result is not so surprising. Minimizing opportunistic partner behavior
in cooperative contracts will be more difficult when the technology is characterized by a large
amount of uncertainty. Therefore, it seems important to distinguish between costs and risks
when analyzing the cooperation decision. Substituting COST and RISK with an independent
variable that combines cost and risk factors, as is frequently done in the literature, results in an
insignificant parameter estimate. As expected, the higher the availability of technological know-
how for innovation, which increases the scope for complementarities to exploit through
cooperation, the higher is the probability of cooperation (TECH) (28). 
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(25) See Table A2a in Appendix for the first-step regressions from which the predicted values for INSPILL,
PROTstrat and PermRD have been constructed. 
(26) In order to consider the regression of the endogenous variables on all exogenous variables as a correction
for measurement error, we need to assume that the measurement error of the other qualitative exogeneous
variables (COST, RISK and TECH) is uncorrelated with the error in INSPILL and PROTstrat (see footnote
15). Nevertheless, estimating the model without these other qualitative variables did not change our results
on the coefficients of INSPILL and PROTstrat significantly. Furthermore, we could not reject the null
hypothesis for no endogeneity of a Hausman test for this case.
(27) INSPILL, PROTstrat and PermRD are closely related to the same —assumed exogenous—variables such
as COST, BasicRD and EXPint.
(28) Sakakibara (1997a,b) also finds that expected complementaries are one of the most important motives for
forming government sponsored research consortia in Japan. Where Sakakibara (1997a, b) explicitly
analyzed the motives for cooperation in R&D, the CIS questionnaire analyzed innovative behavior in
general. The questions from which we derive our explanatory variables were never directly related to the
decision of the firm to cooperate, but were rather related to the firm’s innovative behavior. As a result, we
expect our results to be less driven by what managers answering the questionnaire thought was the
"correct" answer with respect to the cooperation decision.The overall predictive power of the estimated cooperation model is good; for
instance, for the exogenous model of regression (2), more than 74% of all cases are predicted
correctly (29). There is however a tendency to underpredict the number of cooperative cases:
only 69% of all cooperations were predicted correctly (30). 
Spillovers and Cooperation with different types of partners
The importance of distinguishing between incoming spillovers and appropriability is
highlighted when we distinguish between cooperation along the vertical chain, i.e. with
suppliers or customers, and cooperation with research institutes.  In our data set, 33% of the
firms cooperate with customers or suppliers, while 33% cooperate with research institutes. Of
the cooperating firms, 46% have cooperative agreements of both types. Tables 3 and 4
present the results of a similar exercise as performed in the previous section, but for the
separately estimated probit models. For the sake of brevity, we will mainly restrict attention
to the results of the two-step procedure, i.e. regressions (4) and (5) in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3. Results of Probit Regressions for Cooperations with Customers and Suppliers
15





















































































































***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
robust standarderrors between brackets. The coefficients are the marginal effect of the
independent variable on the probability of cooperation, ceteris paribus. For PermRD it
isthe effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 in (1) and (2).
(29) The naïve model would classify 55% correctly.
(30) The percentages for regression (4) are comparable: 72% and 62% respectively.Table 4. Results of Probit Regressions for Cooperations with Research Institutes
Some interesting differences emerge in the effect of incoming spillovers and
strategic protection depending of the type of partner one cooperates with. Incoming spillovers
have a significantly positive effect on cooperation with research institutes. On the contrary, in
vertical cooperation, the positive impact of incoming spillovers loses significance, once
corrected for endogeneity.  A different pattern emerges for appropriability through strategic
protection. The effectiveness of strategic protection is not a significant factor when deciding
about cooperating with research institutes. For vertical cooperation, however, the
effectiveness of strategic protection is important to induce cooperation. Strategic protection
remains significant across specifications. All this seems to suggest that outgoing spillovers
between industrial partners are more critical than spillovers to non-industrial partners. This is
reminiscent of the idea that competitors learn about their rivals through common suppliers or
customers. Furthermore, firms want to avoid backward integration by customers or forward
integration by suppliers because of what they learn through cooperative agreements.
For both types of cooperative agreements, firm size is an important determinant. It is
interesting to observe that high cost (COST) and low risks (RISK) are relevant for cooperation
with research institutes.  These results are related to the more basic nature of joint R&D with
research institutes. This type of agreements entails higher costs and thus scope for cost
16





















































































































***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
robust standarderrors between brackets. The coefficients are the marginal effect of the
independent variable on the probability of cooperation, ceteris paribus. For PermRD it
isthe effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 in (1) and (2).sharing and higher risks with an increasing probability for opportunism by partners. The
search for external know-how and complementarities (TECH), however, is only significant
for vertical cooperative agreements, where the matching of existing technological capabilities
is an important element of the cooperative agreement.  High costs (COST) affect the
organization of vertical cooperative agreements to a less significant extent than in the case of
cooperative agreements with research institutes.
Incoming Spillovers and Strategic Protection
In Table 5 we present the results of the second-stage regressions of INSPILL and
PROTstrat  respectively. Regressions (1) and (2) use the predicted value for cooperative
agreements of the pooled regression (31). Regressions (4) and (5) distinguish the type of
cooperative agreement for the predicted value of the cooperative agreement (32). The results
of Table 5 suggest that there is only weak evidence for endogeneity of INSPILL  and
PROTstrat, with respect to the cooperative decision (33). On the one hand, firms that
cooperate with research institutes will have a higher rating of the importance of incoming
spillovers for their innovation process. This positive coefficient, although only significant at
the 10% level, is consistent with an information sharing explanation of cooperation where
cooperating firms increase their incoming spillovers because there are more opportunities for
information sharing due to the more basic nature of research projects (Regression (3)).
Furthermore, regression (4) demonstrates that there is a positive effect of cooperative
agreements on the effectiveness of protection, most likely through increased complexity of
products and processes, or through gaining lead time on competitors (34). On the other hand,
regression (4) suggests that vertical cooperative agreements would reduce the effectiveness of
strategic protection. The commercially sensitive information that firms might disseminate
indirectly through cooperative agreements with suppliers and customers could be detrimental
to the efforts of the firm to appropriate the returns from its innovation process. Therefore,
care should be taken to protect one’s proprietary information before engaging in these types
of agreements. In sum, our results indicate that by engaging in different types of cooperative
R&D agreements, firms can affect their knowledge in- and outflows.
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(31) See Table A2a in Appendix for the first-step regressions from which the predicted values for COOP and
PermRD have been constructed.
(32) See Table A2b in Appendix for the first-step regressions from which the predicted values for COOPVERT,
COOPRES and PermRD have been constructed.
(33) The Hausman test for endogeneity rejects the null hypothesis for no endogeneity of INSPILL and
PROTstrat at the 10% level of significance only for the case of cooperation with research institutes. For
the other case, the null could not be rejected.
(34) This effect is marginally significant at 11%.
(35) Note that BasicRD is an important—exogenous—regressor for PermRD (Tables A2a and A2b).Table 5. Incoming Spillovers and Strategic Protection
Turning next to other determinants of incoming spillovers and strategic protection,
we find that absorptive capacity as measured by PermRD positively affects the importance
the firm attaches to incoming spillovers and the effectiveness of measures of appropriability,
but this effect is only significant for the former. The R&D orientation of the firms (BasicRD)
is also an important determinant of incoming spillovers (35). Firms involved in more basic
R&D projects consider incoming spillovers as more important for their innovation process.
This result is reminiscent of Kamien and Zang’s (2000) approach to endogenizing spillovers
through the choice of research design, where basic research projects are more susceptible to
external information flows. Firms facing tougher competitive environments, such as
exporting firms (EXPint), will more effectively protect their know-how strategically. Not
surprisingly, firms operating in industries characterized by easier external technology
appropriation are more likely to rate incoming spillovers as important (IndINSPILL).
Similarly, technology or market characteristics favoring strategic protection will help firms to









































































*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, † significant at 15%,
robust standard errors between brackets.
(35) Note that BasicRD is an important—exogenous—regressor for PermRD (Tables A2a and A2b).Conclusions
Our results on the relationship between firm-specific spillovers and cooperation
measured at the firm level seem to suggest that indeed incoming and outgoing spillovers have
important and separately identifiable effects: firms with higher incoming spillovers and lower
outgoing spillovers, i.e. better appropriation, have a higher probability of cooperating in
R&D.  Zeroing in on the type of partner in the cooperative agreements allows us to
distinguish these effects more clearly. Incoming spillovers significantly affect the probability
of cooperating with research institutes, while appropriability through the effectiveness of
strategic protection matters for cooperative agreements in the vertical chain. This latter result
does not support most of the theoretical models evaluating the relation between spillovers
and R&D cooperation.  These models would predict that firms are more likely to form
cooperative agreements in R&D when the appropriation regime is loose.
Correcting for the endogeneity of spillovers and R&D cooperation is important in
order to evaluate the magnitude of the effect of spillovers on the decision to cooperate.
Although not affecting the direction of the effects of incoming and outgoing spillovers on
cooperation, the correction suggests that the average cooperating firm weakly increases the
importance of incoming spillovers. Our results therefore provide some support for
information sharing, especially within cooperative R&D agreements with research institutes
as partners. Furthermore, we find that cooperative agreements with vertically related firms
can potentially diminish firms’ ability to appropriate the results of the innovation process. 
Additional empirical work is needed to verify the robustness of our results. The
EUROSTAT/CIS data are a rich data set, allowing for the replication of this exercise for other
European countries. However, the qualitative nature of most of the information limits the
analysis in terms of quantifying R&D cooperation, R&D spillovers and their relation.
Furthermore, in the absence of a panel data set it is very hard to control for unobserved firm
heterogeneity. We hope that in the future alternative data sources will become available which
allow for the construction of similar, more quantitative, measures of incoming spillovers and
appropriability across a panel of firms. In addition, our results provide some interesting
suggestions for further theoretical work on the issue of spillovers and R&D cooperation. First,
the importance of the distinction between incoming spillovers and appropriability as a
determinant of different types of cooperative agreements in R&D should be developed in more
detail. Different spillover measures seem to have a separately identifiable impact on the firm’s
cooperation decisions. Second, the relation between spillovers and cooperative agreements
should be analyzed in the broader context of the firm’s innovation strategy. Firms that decide to
be innovation active need to understand the complementarities that exist between own R&D
programs, cooperative agreements in R&D and external technology acquisition in order to take
advantage of publicly available information within the innovation process and to better
appropriate the results of successful outcomes of the innovation process. We still have a poor
understanding of these issues and hope that our results provide some useful directions towards
improving theoretical modeling of these questions.
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24DATA AND METHODS APPENDIX
The data are a cross-section of Belgian manufacturing firms in 1992. A
representative sample of 1335 Belgian manufacturing firms was selected and a 13-page
questionnaire sent out to them. The response rate was higher than 50% (748). The researchers
in charge of collecting the data for the CIS also performed a limited non-response analysis
and concluded that no systematic biases could be detected (Debackere and Fleurent, 1995).
From the raw questionnaire data we constructed the variables for our analysis described in
Table A1.
For example:
Table A1: Description of Variables
25
12
3 − + +
=
Shows Trade Score s Conference d Specialize Score Info Patent Score
INSPILL
COOP COOP=1, if firms cooperate with
1.  Suppliers, or,
2.  Customers, or,
3.  Competitors, or,
4.  Public researchinstitutes, or,
5.  Private research institutes, or,
6.  Universities.
INDCOOP Mean of COOP at industry level. Industry level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
COOPVERT COOPVERT=1, if firms cooperate with
1.  Suppliers, or,
2.  Customers.
INDCOOPVERT Mean of COOPVERT at industry level. Industry level is defined at 2-digit
NACE.
COOPRES COOPRES=1, if firms cooperate with
1.  Public researchinstitutes, or,
2.  Private research institutes, or,
3.  Universities.
INDCOOPRES Mean of COOPRES at industry level. Industry level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
SIZE Firm Sales in 1992 in10
10 BEF.
SIZEsq Firm Sales in 1992 in10
10 BEF squared.
EXPint Export sharein total Firm Sales
PermRD PermRD=1 if the firm’sresearchand development activities have a permanent
character.
INDPERMRD Mean of PermRD at industry level. Industry level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
INSPILL Sum of scores ofimportance of following information sources for innovation
process (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)):
1.  Patent information
2.  Specialized conferences, meetings and publications
3.  Trade shows and seminars.
(rescaled between 0 and 1)The two-step estimation procedure used to correct for endogeneity of COOP
(COOPVERT, COOPRES) and INSPILL, PROTstrat and PermRD, regresses the endogenous
variables on all the assumed exogenous variables in the first step: SIZE, SIZEsq,
IndPROTleg, COST, RISK, TECH, BasicRD, EXPint, IndCOOP (IndCOOPVERT,
IndCOOPRES), IndINSPILL, IndPROTstrat, IndPermRD. In the second step, we use the
predicted values of the endogenous variables of the first-step as right hand side variables in
the specified regressions of Tables 2 to 5. Table A2 presents the regression results from the
first step. Note that COOP (COOPVERT, COOPRES) are probit regressions while INSPILL,
26
PROTstrat Sum of scores of effectiveness of following methods for protecting new products/
processes (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)):
1. Secrecy for protecting products,
2. Complexity of product or process design for protecting products,
3. Lead time on competitors for protecting products,
4. Secrecy for protecting processes,
5. Complexity of product or process design for protecting processes,
6. Lead time on competitors for protecting processes.
(rescaled between 0 and 1)
IndINSPILL Mean of INSPILL at industry level. Industry level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
IndPROTstrat Mean of PROTstrat at industry level. Industry level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
IndPROTleg Mean of PROTleg at industry level. Industry level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
PROTleg is Sum of scores of effectiveness of following methods for protecting new
products/processes (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)):
1. Patents for protecting products,
2. Registration of brands, copyright for protecting products, 
3. Patents for protecting processes,
4. Registration of brands, copyright for protecting processes.
(rescaled between 0 and 1)
COST Sum of scores of importance of following obstacles to innovation process (number
between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)):
1. No suitable financing available, 
2. High costs of innovation, 
3. Pay-back period too long, 
4. Innovation cost hard to control.
(rescaled between 0 and 1)
RISK Importance of high risks as an obstacle to innovation (number between 1
(unimportant) and 5 (crucial), rescaled between 0 and 1).
TECH TECH = 1 – NOTECH
NOTECH = Importance of lack of technological information as an obstacle to innovation
(number between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial), rescaled between 0 and 1).
BasicRD Ratio of between:
1. Sum of scores of importance of following information sources for innovation
process (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)):
a.  Universities,
b.  Public research institutes, and
c.  Technical research institutes
2. Sum of scores of importance of following information sources for innovation
process (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)):
a.  suppliers of materials,
b.  suppliers of equipment, and
c.  customers.PROTstrat and PermRD are OLS regressions. The following equations are estimated in the
second step estimation (36): 
Probit Regressions
COOP* =  α 11 + α 12INSPILL + α 13PROTstrat + α 14 IndPROTleg + α 15PermRD +
α 16SIZE +  α 17 SIZEsq +  α 18 COST +  α 19RISK +  α 110TECH  +  α 111
IndCOOP
COOPVERT* =  α 21 + α 22INSPILL + α 23PROTstrat +α 24 IndPROTleg + α 25 PermRD +
α 26 SIZE +  α 27 SIZEsq +  α 28COST +  α 29RISK +  α 210TECH +
α 211IndCOOPVERT
COOPRES* =  α 31 + α 32INSPILL + α 33PROTstrat + α 34IndPROTleg + α 35PermRD +
α 36SIZE +  α 37SIZEsq +  α 38COST +  α 39RISK +  α 310TECH +
α 311IndCOOPRES
Linear Regressions
INSPILL = β 11 + β 12COOP + β 13PermRD + β 14BasicRD + β 15 indINSPILL
INSPILL =  β 21 + β 22COOPVERT + β 23COOPRES + β 24PermRD + β 25BasicRD +
β 26IndINSPILL
PROTstrat = γ 11 + γ 12COOP + γ 13 PermRD + γ 14 EXPint + γ 15 IndPROTstrat
PROTstrat = γ 21 +  γ 22COOPVERT +  γ 23COOPRES +  γ 24 PermRD +  γ 25 EXPint +
γ 26IndPROTstrat
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(36) The focus of the paper is on the relationship between spillovers and cooperation.  Hence we do not discuss
and specify a second step PermRD equation. The underlined variables are the assumed endogenous
regressors and these coefficients are estimated using the predicted values for these variables from the first
step regression results.Table A2a: Results of First Step Regressions used for
constructing the predicted values of INSPILL, PROTstrat and
PermRD of Table 2, regressions (4) and (5), and COOP and
PermRD of Table 5, regressions (1) and (2).
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*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
standard errors between brackets. The coefficients of the COOP
regression are the marginal effect of the independent variable on the
probability of cooperation, ceteris paribus.Table A2b: Results of First Step Regressions used for constructing the
predicted values of INSPILL, PROTstrat and PermRD of Tables 3 and 4,
regressions (4) and (5), and COOPVERT, COOPRES and PermRD of Table 5,
regressions (3) and (4).
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*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%,
standard errors between brackets. The coefficientsof the COOPVERT and COOPRES
regressions are the marginaleffect of the independent variable on the probabilityof
cooperation, ceteris paribus.